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Abstract 
This paper claims that the European Union (EU) has had a very peculiar relationship 
with the globalized post-Cold War economic order. On the one hand, the EU was 
instrumental in bringing about this order. It aggressively promoted (both internally 
and externally) the principles and policies upon which this economic order has been 
based. On the other hand, this proactive engagement was translated within the EU into 
a highly polarized and antagonistic public discourse that led to a serious identity 
crisis. In this way, it is argued that economic globalization emerged in the EU as a 
debate on the nature and future of Europe. After 2005, this polarized and antagonistic 
discourse started to change. The rise of flexicurity, as a new way of thinking about 
Europe‘s place and orientation in the global political economy, has been instrumental 
in this shift. The paper examines and evaluates these developments and their 
implications for the European project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Social Europe and/or global Europe? Globalization and Flexicurity as Debates 
on the Future of Europe
1
 
 
 
There has been a shift in the terms of engagement of Europe, and particularly of the 
EU, with ‗economic globalization‘. In particular, during the first five years of the 21st 
century the question ‗what is globalization?‘ led the EU to the existential questions of 
‗what is European?‘ and ‗what is possible?‘ within a globalised economic order.  
These questions, in turn, led to two competing discourses/projects within the EU. The 
first proclaiming that Europe, instead of participating in, or contributing to, an 
international ‗race to the bottom‘ in economic, social and environmental terms, must 
intervene in (and humanize) globalization through standing by and defending its 
social model, values and standards of living and working. The second proclaiming 
that globalization is not something that can be resisted. The only way for Europe to 
maintain a strong voice in world politics and to secure its values and living and 
working standards, is by improving its international competitiveness. 
 
After 2005, however, the public discourse within the EU gradually moved away from 
the aforementioned polarized discourse. Rather than being based on two opposing 
points of departure—Anglo-Saxon versus Continental; flexibility versus social 
security—it has shifted and been rearticulated around the concept of flexicurity. 
Flexicurity refers to a set of working arrangements that promote at the same time 
flexibility in the labour market and a high degree of employment and income security. 
It is therefore an economic strategy that pays less emphasis on the protection of jobs, 
and more emphasis on the protection of people. It is taken for granted that within a 
highly globalized and competitive environment employers and enterprises must be 
flexible and able to continually restructure themselves. Yet, this flexible system 
remains committed to the principles of social protection, cohesion and solidarity. In 
this manner flexibility is combined with a range of policies that increase workers 
security, and their ability to plan their lives and careers (European Commission 
2007a, 7). 
 
Flexicurity has not only been used to redefine the aforementioned polarizing terms of 
the debate within the EU, but has also functioned as a way of redefining the EU‘s 
place in and stance towards globalization. Thus flexicurity comes to give new flesh 
and bones to the concept of a ‗European Social Model‘, in a way that in principle 
neither the proponents of the Anglo-Saxon, nor those of the Continental model 
oppose. The durability and success of this discursive shift remains to be seen. It can 
be argued that these shifts and choices are attempts by the EU and its member states 
to define a European proposal and modus vivendi in the era of globalization.  
 
A caveat and clarification is important here. The paper refers to and focuses on the 
entity ‗EU‘. By this we do not mean to ascribe strategic agency or actorness to the EU 
with regard to the phenomena we analyse. As it will become clear throughout our 
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analysis what are taken to be EU actions, developments or positions are nothing more 
than the outcome of the uncoordinated, or even antagonistic, actions and interactions 
of its member states. Yet seen from the outside these actions and interactions do 
create a ‗whole‘ that defines the nature, identity, orientation and movement of the 
entity EU. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we examine the EU‘s place and role in 
the production of ‗economic globalization‘. Second, we analyse the impact that 
economic globalization had on the public discourse of the EU. Here we try to 
demonstrate how the EU—through the cooperation or antagonism of its member 
states—engaged with and positioned itself within this economic globalization order. 
Third, we evaluate the EU‘s aspirations to acquire a leadership role within the global 
political economy, using examples from its trade diplomacy. This is followed by a 
discussion of the impact these aspirations and policies may have on the EU itself. 
 
 
 
The EU and Economic Globalization 
 
The European Union holds a very strong position in international political economy. 
Its population (493 million) is the world‘s third largest after China (1,306 million) and 
India (1,080 million), and followed by the US (296 million) (European Commission 
2007c, 9). Furthermore, the EU includes five out of the 10 largest national economies 
of the world, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain), and has the highest GDP (goods and services) output in the 
world (11.0 billion Euros), followed by the US (10.0 billion Euros), Japan (3.7 billion 
Euros) and China (1.8 billion Euros) (European Commission 2007c, 46)
2
. It is also 
represented by four members (Germany, UK, France and Italy) in the G7.  
 
Furthermore, according to Fortune‘s 2007 ranking of the world‘s 500 largest 
corporations, the European Union is at the top with 165 corporations, followed by the 
US (162 corporations) and Japan (67 corporations). Similarly, according to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 50 out of the top 100 
nonfinancial corporations (in 2005), and 30 out of the top 50 financial corporations (in 
2004) ranked by foreign assets, were based in the EU (see, respectively, UNCTAD 
2007, 229–231 and UNCTAD 2006, 287). 
 
The decisive position of the EU in the world economy is also evident in the category 
of foreign direct investments (FDI). In 2006, the EU accounted for almost half (47 per 
cent) of the world‘s outward FDI, compared to 18 per cent for the US and 6.1 per cent 
for the region of East Asia as a whole (including China). Similarly the EU is the 
largest recipient of FDI, receiving 40.7 per cent of the global FDI pie, well ahead of 
the US that receives 13.4 per cent, and East Asia that receives 9.7 per cent (UNCTAD 
2007, 2). In 2006, the EU was also the world‘s leading exporter and importer of 
services, as well as the world‘s leading exporter and the second largest importer of 
goods (WTO 2007, 13, 15). 
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Considering the EU‘s central position in the global economy it seems impossible for 
globalization to have taken place without the EU‘s endorsement and promotion. Yet 
the most important politico-economic project in the region in the last decades has 
been that of European integration. Is European integration then to be understood as a 
feature of globalization? If not, what is the relationship between these two processes 
(cf Rosamond 2005)? 
 
 
European Integration and Globalization 
 
A key event for conceptualizing the relationship between European integration and 
globalization is the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. In many 
respects, the SEA was born out of the unsatisfactory progress towards completing the 
common market of goods agreed to in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. With the SEA, 
western European states set as their target the transformation of their region from an 
incomplete common market of goods to a single market—that is an area where 
capital, goods, services and labour would enjoy free movement. To meet this target 
the participating member states carried out a large politico-economic programme of 
market and capital account liberalization. This programme involved a far-reaching 
deregulation process at the national level, combined with a reregulation process at the 
EU level (Tsoukalis 2003). 
 
The single market project was then pushed forward with the Treaty of Maastricht, 
signed in the beginning of the 1990s. The target of the treaty was the establishment of 
an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a single currency (Euro replaced ECU 
in 1999 and entered in circulation in 2002). EMU was then followed by the Lisbon 
Strategy, which was launched in 2000 with ‗a view to make the European Union ―the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world‖‘ by 2010 
(European Council, 2000)
3
.  
 
Taking into consideration these developments it can be argued that the European 
integration was a globalization project. Indeed, the integration of EU member states‘ 
financial markets, along with the promotion of a neoliberal politico-economic agenda 
that involved conservative fiscal policies, the reduction of state intervention in the 
economy, a smaller state sector and the liberalization and deregulation of national 
economic frameworks, contributed a great deal to the global integration of financial 
markets and the transformation of international political economy in terms of 
(neoliberal) globalization. Furthermore, economic integration in the EU stimulated 
third countries to ask for multilateral and preferential liberalization involving the EU, 
thus accelerating the process of economic globalization. 
 
Interestingly, however, much of the rationale and justification for the single market 
and the EMU were predicated on the need to deal with what is presently referred to as 
economic globalization. The main argument was that an integrated Europe would be 
better positioned to survive and prosper in an era of relentless international 
competition. A bigger market would allow European companies to increase their 
competitiveness and efficiency; and increased competition and efficiency along with 
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new optimum economies of scale would speed up growth rates, thus generating jobs, 
wealth and prosperity. The manufacturing sector in the EU member states acted as an 
antenna for the changing international environment and the challenges ahead. In the 
case of the textiles sector, for instance, whereas intra-EU15 imports remained 
relatively stable during 1988–2002 (21–24 per cent of total consumption), EU15 
imports from the rest of the world increased gradually but steadily from 15 per cent to 
35 per cent (European Commission 2007b, 18–20). 
 
What were the actors/forces driving these dynamics? National governments had the 
first say in these changes and were at the helm throughout the integration process. The 
important role of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in 
keeping the integration on track must also be underlined (Dashwood 1983). Last but 
not least, the role of big European business, although hard to discern and prove, has 
also been instrumental for the direction of the European integration. In this regard, 
Tsoukalis argues that ‗big business in Europe came to perceive the fragmentation of 
the European market, caused by persisting government intervention and various forms 
of non-tariff barriers, as the main reasons for the lack of competitiveness in 
international markets‘ (2003, 48). The single market project seems to have been a 
response to these concerns. Thus, the big European business and employers, either 
through their institutional mechanisms (mainly the European Round Table of 
Industrialists, ERT and the Union of Industrial and Employers‘ Confederation of 
Europe, UNICE) or out of them, must be considered as a critical force behind regional 
integration in Europe (Cowles 1995; Rosamond 2002; Bieler 2003). Finally, and with 
regard to the historical economic context, the economic hardship that followed the 
1970s oil shocks could also be considered an important factor in the direction of the 
integration project, for it created a crisis (and a sense of crisis related to the perceived 
failure of Keynesian policies) that opened the policy window to new ideas, 
represented by monetarism and supply-side economics. 
 
Yet European integration cannot be boiled down to ‗neoliberal globalization‘. The 
Single European Act and EMU did not only introduce neoliberalism in the EU. They 
also set as their aim the ‗economic and social cohesion‘ of the EU, and created the 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund to support and secure this aim through 
(unprecedented) redistribution provisions. In this manner, redistribution became a 
defining part of EU ‗globalization policies‘. Some analysts would treat this 
development as evidence of a distinctive European, social model of capitalism; others, 
as a way of buying support and creating consent in favour of the single market and 
EMU (Tsoukalis 2003, 19, 50–53; European Commission 2005; Allen 2005). 
 
To summarize, the European integration process could and should be seen as an 
integral feature of the economic globalization order. Therefore, the appellation ‗US 
contrôlée‘ given to the contemporary international economic order does not seem 
accurate. The EU played a significant and independent role in the production of this 
order. Yet European integration as a globalization process has been distinctively 
‗European‘ in two ways. First, it took place as a response to globalization. Thus, 
although the integration process accelerated cross-border assets acquisition, the 
integration of financial markets and the general spread of neoliberal economic norms, 
policies and practices, it was conceived and designed by Europeans as a means of 
dealing with increased economic globalization and global competition. In this regard, 
the phenomenon of globalization was instrumental in the definition of European 
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integration (for a similar process in the case of NAFTA see Helleiner 2007). Second, 
in Europe, ‗liberalization . . . [became] directly linked to redistribution‘ (Tsoukalis 
2003, 19). Thus, European economic integration was not only conceived by the 
majority of European states and populations as a response to globalization but also as 
a project that served the vision of a politically united Europe, while following a 
distinctively European tradition of political economy, often referred to as the ‗social 
model‘ (for contemporary debates on the ‗social model‘ see Giddens et al 2006). 
 
 
The EU and Economic Globalization beyond European Integration 
 
The European Union‘s relation to economic globalization is not limited to the 
domestic sphere of European integration. In most international economic fora, the EU 
advocated and proactively supported the ‗economic globalisation‘ throughout the 
1990s. Thus, despite the arguments about trade wars and the collapse of transatlantic 
economic relations after the end of the Cold War (Schott 1996), the US and the EU 
worked hard together to build the cornerstones of the post-Cold War order of 
economic globalization (Eichengreen 1996; Van der Pijl 2006). They joined their 
efforts to promote and implement—through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank—the Washington Consensus as an all-valid recipe for 
international development. Furthermore, the Paris-based Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) offered similar neoliberal economic 
recommendations to its member states (reduction of the size of state and its 
involvement in the economy, privatizations, liberalization and deregulation of 
markets). Moreover, a central aim shared both by the EU and the US was the need to 
expand and liberalize the multilateral trade regime (thus also securing and improving 
their market access in an ever-increasing number of countries). This cooperation led 
to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
Taking into consideration the above, it can be argued that the EU‘s strategy towards 
the US, with regard to the post-Cold War economic order, cannot be captured by the 
concepts of balancing and bandwagoning. The EU had and has its own independent 
standing in the creation of the post-Cold War economic order. That is, its policies and 
stance are not reducible to a strategy of balancing or bandwagoning, but should be 
seen, at least partly, as independent strategic choices, made on the basis of real (or 
perceived as such) interests and gain considerations. This again raises the question: 
who is the EU? Addressing this question in depth is beyond our aim here. Yet the role 
of particularistic, sectoral and trans-European groupings, coalitions and economic 
interests (along with that of ‗national interests‘) should not be underestimated. 
Examining how the EU positions on the Doha Developmental Agenda compare with 
those of specific economic and social interests, Andreas Dür (2008) has found that the 
EU positions correspond strongly with the positions voiced by European economic 
interests—including UNICE, the European Roundtable of Industrialists, national 
employers‘ associations and other relevant economic or sectoral (for example 
farmers) groups and associations. Furthermore, the more concentrated a group or 
association is, the more likely it is that their positions are going to be reflected as 
official EU positions. 
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It should be noted here, however, that the aforementioned independent standing of the 
EU in the production of the post-Cold War economic order does not exclude aspects 
of what we could call the ‗socialization‘ of the EU in its changing environment. The 
emergence of globalization discourse itself, for instance, within the EU and its 
member states, is an integral part of this socialization process. To a significant extent 
the same can also be said about the rise of the concept of flexicurity that emerged as a 
way out of the cul-de-sac that had been reached by the antagonism between the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Continental models (see below). Similarly, analysing the EU‘s 
role in the Doha Round, Young notes: 
 
As a consequence of changing firm interests and the increasing acceptance of 
liberal economic ideas among the governments of the Member States and 
particularly within the Commission and the reinforcing of trade as a development 
issue, the preferences underlying the EU‘s traditional trade policy have become 
more liberal (2007, 801). 
 
The next section aims to complement the above analysis with a discussion about how 
European societies felt about the emerging new global economic order, and how their 
reactions affected the EU‘s engagement with economic globalization. To do so, we 
examine the impact of the emergence of economic globalization on the public 
discourse of the EU and its member states (see also Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay 
and Smith 2005; Antoniades 2007a; 2007b). 
 
 
 
 
Europe’s Entanglement with Economic Globalization 
 
This section of the paper makes two main claims. First, that although the EU and its 
member states have been instrumental in the production of the globalized post-Cold 
War economic order, this order generated a polarized identity crisis within the EU. 
Second, that the significant implications of this crisis seem to be overcome gradually 
after 2005 when the concept of flexicurity emerged and was formulated as a way of 
bridging the opposite poles that defined this identity crisis, as well as offering a 
European way of dealing with economic globalization. 
 
 
Stage I: Economic Globalization as a New Zone of Antagonism
4
 
 
By the end of the 1990s globalization had acquired a negative connotation for the 
majority of citizens in several European states. This negative connotation was clearly 
reflected in a number of Eurobarometer surveys during the 2000s. For instance, in a 
Eurobarometer survey in 2005, globalization conjured up negative images for 46 per 
cent of the EU25 respondents as shown in Figure 1 (Eurobarometer 2005, 57, 
annexes; see also Eurobarometer 2004, B2–B4). 
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Table 1. Attitudes towards Globalisation – Selected EU countries, 2005  
(% of respondents) 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer (2005, 57 and annexes; see also Eurobarometer 2004, B2–B4 and 
Eurobarometer 2003). 
 
Note: The original survey question was: Could you please tell me whether the term globalisation brings 
to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative. Table 1 presents the 
aggregates for positive and negative responses. 
  
A decisive factor in the negative attitudes of Europeans towards globalization seems 
to have been the phenomena of relocation—the move of large European enterprises to 
low-cost countries (Schmidt 2006). In particular, in 2006 close to half of the 
respondents (49 per cent) in a Eurobarometer survey felt that globalization had a 
fairly negative effect on employment in their country (contrary to 27 per cent who 
believed the opposite) (Eurobarometer 2006, 89); and throughout the period 2005–07 
the first thing that came to mind to most Europeans when they ‗heard the word 
‘globalization‘ was ‗relocation‘ (35 per cent in 2007), followed by ‗[o]pportunities for 
national companies in terms of new outlets‘ with 22 per cent (Eurobarometer 2007, 
156). 
 
In this context, globalization came to be conceptualized as a direct threat to the 
traditional ‗European social model‘. This development was the first defining feature 
of the emergence of globalization discourse within the EU (or to be more accurate 
within the EU15). The second defining feature was the association of globalization 
with a/the (Anglo-Saxon) model of capitalism that was considered to be foreign to 
and noncompatible with the (Continental) ‗European social tradition‘. The conflict 
between the two ‗models‘ (Anglo-Saxon versus Continental) was of course not new. 
However, it gained unprecedented publicity, popularity and momentum after the mid-
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1990s (Antoniades 2007a). Thus, economic globalization was ‗translated‘ within the 
EU into a polarized zone of competition between two antagonistic 
discourses/projects—the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon (or Liberal) (see also 
Policy Network 2006). These discourses were based on different conceptions of what 
is European and what Europe should do in the era of globalization. In the Continental 
discourse globalization emerged as a zone of contestation and a process that needs to 
be controlled, if not resisted. In the Anglo-Saxon discourse it emerged as a new 
challenge that requires a new ‗ideology‘ and new set of policies in order to be met. It 
should be stressed, however, that these two antagonistic discourses, as used here, did 
not correspond to specific geographical areas, but were (and are) embedded in broader 
transnational discursive fields. Thus, Anglo-Saxon attitudes have been held by 
groups/actors in Continental Europe and vice versa. 
 
The two competing discourses shared a common normative (European) view of rights, 
modernity and the world, but adopted different ontological positions with regard to 
the questions, ‗what is globalization‘ and ‗what is possible in (the context of) 
globalization‘. The Continental perspective was based on the assumption that 
globalization is what is produced through states‘ policies and practices. Thus for 
instance, by defending European working standards in an ever-interdependent world, 
it was argued that a more humane globalization process was secured. This approach 
suggested that Europe‘s stance and orientation towards economic globalization should 
be based on and guided by the European values and rights on which the traditional 
European social model has been based. It further suggested that taking neoliberal 
globalization for granted and trying to adapt to it, is a strategy for producing 
neoliberal globalization. Europe, therefore, had to work to produce another 
globalization that would be based on the principles of its social model. The Anglo-
Saxon perspective, on the other hand, was based on the assumption that the 
globalization of production and finance and the revolution in technologies and 
communications had unleashed forces that were beyond European control. This 
process carried with it a great promise for growth, welfare and prosperity nationally 
and globally. Yet to take advantage of it, and to secure the welfare and prosperity of 
its citizens, Europe had to adapt to globalization. For this approach, the alternative to 
globalization was isolation (Blair 2005), that is there was no real alternative to 
economic globalization. Therefore it was suggested that Europe‘s orientation and 
stance on economic globalization should be based on competitiveness. 
 
The above two perspectives were thus based on two opposing mantras: ‗no 
competition or development without social standards‘ versus ‗(there will be) no social 
standards and development without competition‘. Of course, the two perspectives did 
not ignore each other. Those who advocated that Europe needs to ‗defend‘ its social 
model, did not ignore that competitiveness is a decisive factor for survival in today‘s 
world; and those that advocated that Europe needs to be above all ‗competitive‘, did 
not ignore the importance of maintaining certain elements of the Continental social 
model. Yet the two approaches set different priorities and criteria for assessing 
success and, most importantly, were based on different understandings of 
globalization and the ‗possible‘. It is important to note here that the aforementioned 
two ‗poles‘ did not exhaust the different views towards Europe‘s future and 
globalization within the EU, but their antagonism did set the terms in which those 
issues were discussed and negotiated within the EU. 
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Furthermore, the zone of antagonism produced by the aforementioned competing 
projects was not limited to the realm of economic policies. Economic globalization 
forced Europeans to reflect on who they are and where they want to go. Therefore, 
what was at stake in this antagonistic field was the nature of European identity itself. 
To a great extent, this was also the reason why the debate between the two projects 
led to a cul-de-sac, which became explicit during thepublic debate on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France, and reached its peak immediately after the ‗no‘ votes 
in the French (29 May 2005) and Dutch (1 June 2005) referenda. 
 
 
Stage II: from model antagonism to a cul-de-sac (and its implications) 
 
The antagonism between the two competing projects was personified in the public 
opposition and hostility developed between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac (and to a 
lesser degree Gerhard Schröder) over the issue. This opposition brought the EU to a 
standstill. The first victim of the intensification of this antagonism was the European 
Union summit that aimed to decide the EU‘s 2007–2013 budget (18 June 2005). 
Jacques Chirac demanded Britain give up part of its budget rebate. Tony Blair 
responded with a counterdemand for further CAP reforms and a corresponding cut in 
EU agricultural subsidies (thus asking for a revision of the agreement on agricultural 
spending that had been reached in June 2003, and which covered the period up to 
2013). Gerhard Schröder joined Jacques Chirac in his critique of Britain‘s stance in 
the negotiations. The result was the collapse of the summit. The issue, however, is not 
simply that the summit collapsed—which is not surprising for EU politics—but rather 
the extent of the antagonistic and hostile environment that led to, and was fuelled by, 
its collapse. 
 
The atmosphere after the failed summit was one of deep divisions, disappointment, 
embarrassment and pessimism. Indicatively, the Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern 
stated after the meeting: ‗I hate to see grown men bickering at each other‘, and called 
the debate over money ‗pathetic and embarrassing‘. In a similar manner, 
Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker, who tried to reach a compromise 
between the competing demands (Luxembourg held the EU presidency), said: ‗My 
enthusiasm for Europe has suffered a profound shock‘, and went on to praise the 
negotiation stance of the new member states by noting that these countries ‗[gave] us 
a lesson in ambition. I think this is a good reason for those not able to speak the same 
language to be ashamed of what they did‘. Jacques Chirac referred to ‗British 
intransigence‘ and Gerhard Schröder to ‗the stubbornness‘ of Britain as decisive 
factor for the collapse of the summit
5
. 
 
After the summit, the opposition between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac turned to an 
exchange of views on models of political economy and their performance within 
globalization. As a response to the Continental critics of the Anglo-Saxon model, 
Tony Blair, in a highly influential speech to the European Parliament (23 June 2005), 
proclaimed: 
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 All quotes are from: Elaine Sciolino, ‗European Union‘s Heated Budget Negotiations Collapse‘, The 
New York Times, 18 June 2005, and, Stephen Castle and John Lichfiled, ‗Juncker Plays the Blame 
Game as Blair prepares for EU Precidency‘, The Independent, 23 June 2005. 
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Some have suggested I want to abandon Europe‘s social model. . . . But tell me: 
what type of social model is it that has 20 million unemployed in Europe, 
productivity rates falling behind those of the United States; that is allowing more 
science graduates to be produced by India than by Europe . . . (Blair 2005). 
 
Blair was making the case that an open and flexible system like the British was much 
better positioned to face the challenge of globalization, and therefore the European 
Union had to move towards that direction if it was to survive and defend its living 
standards in the age of globalization. Responding to this, Jacques Chirac in a televised 
interview given on Bastille Day (14 July 2005), proclaimed: 
 
I don‘t believe the British model is one we should envy or copy. Admittedly, 
unemployment there is lower than ours, significantly so, but if you take the 
important things in life in society—health policy, the fight against poverty—you 
see that we are nevertheless in a far better position than the British (Chirac 2005). 
 
In these developments the role of the European Commission and its president Jose 
Manual Barroso was rather that of a mere observer, without any powers or means to 
affect the nature or direction of the opposing dynamics. Furthermore, the international 
political juncture, and especially the controversy over the Iraq war, exacerbated these 
opposing dynamics, contributing significantly to the deterioration of the relations 
among the EU3 leaders. Thus during the first years of the new millennium the EU 
seemed to be heading towards disintegration. 
 
 
Stage III: Flexicurity as a Way Out? 
 
A number of factors and developments that took place after the summer of 2005, 
however, contributed to the transformation of the aforementioned bipolar discursive 
field that dominated European politics and public discourse. We examine these factors 
below, establishing why 2005 can be seen as a turning point in the way the EU 
positioned itself towards economic globalization. The coming into power of Angela 
Merkel, in September 2005, was instrumental in this regard. Merkel took a much 
more ‗pro-British‘ stance, especially towards the issue of the British rebate, and this 
created a positive aura for her in the British press. Indicatively, in a parliamentary 
debate before her election as Chancellor, Merkel said of the rebate: 
 
It does not make it easy when one side says that agricultural subsidies are 
sacrosanct, we cannot touch them, and at the same time flexibility is being 
demanded from others. . . . The British must move, that is indisputable. 
But compromises cannot be expected from one side when the other side says that 
its benefits are sacrosanct
6
. 
 
Furthermore, Merkel adopted an explicit pro-transatlantic stance and rhetoric which, 
among other things, aimed to heal the transatlantic bitterness and divisions generated 
by the Iraq war. 
 
Alongside these rhetorical developments, the most significant signal that something 
could be changing in the EU‘s deadlock came from the successful conclusion of the 
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over Rebate‘, The Times, 17 June 2005.   
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EU summit that took place in December 2005 (hosted by Britain), and aimed to 
decide the still-pending EU budget. Merkel‘s decisive role in this success and her 
negotiating, mediating and reconciliation skills were widely hailed in Europe and the 
European press. She was portrayed and praised as the person who managed to bridge 
the gap between Blair and Chirac, adopting at the same time, a much more 
conciliatory position towards the demands of the 10 new member states
7
. 
 
The feeling that the EU was moving again dominated the post summit statements of 
the EU leaders. Manuel Barroso stated: ‗Europe is on the move‘. Mrs Merkel said: 
‗[t]he big cloud has been lifted from Europe . . . [The deal] shows Europe is capable 
of acting‘. In similar lines, the Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel and his 
Danish counterpart noted respectively: ‗I have the impression that we are moving, 
gradually, maybe slowly . . . in the right direction‘ and ‗[w]e can now again get 
momentum‘8. 
 
At the same time, Barroso tried to take a more active stance in moving the European 
debate beyond the binary opposites of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models (see 
European Commission 2005). The informal meeting of heads of states and 
governments, including Mr Barroso, held by the UK EU presidency at Hampton Court 
Palace, in Surrey, in October 2005, was significant in this discursive shift. Most 
importantly, it brought the concept of flexicurity to the heart of the EU debates and 
negotiations over the ‗European Social Model‘ and its reform. The fact that flexicurity 
finds its origins in the ‗Nordic model‘ that, both in the past and at the face of 
economic globalization, has been able to combine social equality with high growth 
rates, facilitated its role as catalyst in the European public discourse. Thus despite the 
fact that the problematique that has dominated and continues to dominate the public 
discourse of the EU and its member states—social equality and social security versus 
economic competition and economic growth—remains the same, the prism through 
which this problematique was and is negotiated between the EU leaders has been 
changing (also Liddle 2006). 
 
The European Commission tried hard to sustain the momentum of this discursive 
shift. First, it created the European Globalization Adjustment Fund (EGF) (that had 
been discussed in the Hampton Court meeting) (Tsoukalis 2005). The 500 million 
Euro (per year) EGF was agreed to in 2005 and finally adopted in December 2006. Its 
main aim is to play the role of economic globalization‘s ‗shock absorber‘, by helping 
EU workers who lose their jobs due to delocalization and changes in global trade
9
. 
Second, and most importantly, in a very proactive way the European Commission 
tried to ‗bind‘ the European debate about the Social Model and its reform—and thus 
the debate about the ‗European way‘ of being in globalization—to the concept of 
flexicurity. This attempt, with the assistance of several member states, has been quite 
successful. Flexicurity was discussed for the first time at the Council‘s level in 
                                                          
7
 For statements by European leaders, see:  ‗EU pulls itself back from the abyss‘, 19/12/25, available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-pulls-back-abyss/article-151032; for Blair‘s statement, see: 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8834.asp. See also the ‗BBC European Press Review‘ on 
19/12/2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4541054.stm. BBC‘s headline was 
‗Angela Merkel‘s ‗EU triumph‘‘, 17 December 2005. 
8
 For these statements, as well as other similar by EU leaders see: BBC News, ‗In Quotes: EU Leaders 
on Budget Deal‘, 17/12/2005, available at: http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4537304.stm. 
9
 On the EFG see: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/egf/index_en.html. 
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January 2006 at an ‗informal meeting on flexicurity‘, in Villach, Austria. The 
European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
Vladimir Špidla (2006) opened the meeting as follows, 
 
Three months on from the Summit Meeting at Hampton Court, which lent new 
momentum to social Europe, I am pleased to have been invited by the Austrian 
Presidency to take part in a debate on the concept of ‗flexicurity‘. We can learn a 
lot from Austria. With the help of ‗flexicurity‘, Austria has succeeded in combining 
labour market flexibility and social security.  
 
This meeting was followed up by the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels 
European Council in March 2006, where it was noted that the  
 
European Council ask[ed] Member States to direct special attention to the key 
challenge of ‗flexicurity‘ (balancing flexibility and security). . . . In this context, 
the Commission, jointly with Member States and social partners, will explore the 
development of a set of common principles on ‗flexicurity‘. (European Council 
2006, 12). 
 
In May of the same year, the Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Social 
Protection Committee (SPC) of the European Commission produced a joint opinion 
(‗joint contribution‘) on flexicurity, where they noted: 
 
The discussions and preparatory work leading to this contribution have confirmed 
the commitment to explore flexicurity policies as a way to achieve the common 
objectives of the European Employment Strategy. (EMCO and SPC 2006, 1). 
 
Consequently, Finland, which took over the EU presidency from Austria, organized 
an ‗informal tripartite social summit‘ in Lahti in October, through which the Finnish 
presidency and the European Commission tried to bring the European social partners 
on board of the ‗flexicurity venture‘. In the summit the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) positioned itself in favour of a flexicurity formula close to the 
Scandinavian model, where flexibility does not take precedence over security. 
ETUC‘s General Secretary John Monks declared that 
 
[w]e are in favour of flexicurity, on the condition that it creates a win-win situation 
for workers as well as for companies. . . . This presupposes policies to promote 
lifelong learning, and active policies on employment, social protection and support 
for workers during all forms of transition
10
. 
 
The momentum of flexicurity was intensified in 2007. In April, the European 
Commission organized a large ‗stakeholder flexicurity conference‘ with over 400 
representatives of workers, employers, NGOs and governments to debate the 
‗flexicurity approach‘11. In June, the Commission published its communication 
‗Towards common principles of flexicurity: more and better jobs through flexibility 
and security‘, in which it proposed eight principles for the development of a common 
EU approach to flexicurity (published as a booklet in July 2007; see also European 
Commission 2007a). In September, the Portuguese EU Presidency organized a 
                                                          
10
 See ETUC‘s statement at ,http://www.etuc.org/a/2947. 
11
 See the Commission‘s press release, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/news/news_en.cfm?id=225. 
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conference for the relevant European Ministers to discuss the aforementioned 
Commission‘s proposals (representatives of social partners, NGOs and experts were 
also invited to participate in the conference). The European Parliament responded to 
the Commission‘s communication with a ‗resolution on common principles of 
flexicurity‘ (29 November 2007), which—after a number of caveats, and including a 
number of proposals and comments on the Commission‘s proposals—proclaimed that 
the European Parliament 
 
[b]elieves that the rationale for an integrated approach to flexicurity is the need 
to achieve the objectives of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, in particular more 
and better jobs, and at the same time to modernize the European social models
12
. 
 
ETUC welcomed and supported the Parliament‘s ‗balanced approach‘13. Ultimately, 
the Council of the EU ministers of Employment and Social Affairs endorsed ‗the final 
and consensual version of the [eight] common principles of flexicurity‘ in early 
December 2007. It is important to note here that throughout this process the European 
Commission was very careful to clarify that the development of common principles of 
flexicurity, on which an EU-wide flexicurity approach would be based, would not 
imply a ‗one-size-fit-all‘ approach. Along these lines, in its communication, the 
Commission proposed the concept of flexicurity pathways (European Commission 
2007a, 22). In an annex attached to the communication (European Commission 
2007a, 28–35) it articulated four different pathways (which overlap with the four 
different varieties of European capitalism found in the European comparative political 
economy literature: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, Scandinavian, Mediterranean).  
 
The coming into power of Nicolas Sarkozy (May 2007) facilitated the above 
dynamics. Sarkozy‘s very strong proflexibility, pro-US and pro-transatlantic rhetoric 
came to enhance both the afore-described discursive shift within the EU as well as the 
change in transatlantic environment that had been initiated by Angela Merkel (and 
warmly supported by Manuel Barroso). Soon after the change in the French 
presidency, Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair in 10 Downing Street (June 2007). 
Therefore none of the EU3 leaders who were initially involved in the controversy of 
the Iraq war and the collapse of the 2005 EU summit remained at the helms of their 
states and at the centre of European politics. 
 
Do these developments herald the end of the controversy between the Anglo-Saxon 
and the Continental discourses/projects? The answer should be no. For instance, 
Sarkozy‘s successful request to remove a reference to ‗undistorted‘ competition from 
the main objectives of the EU, during the negotiations on the Reform Treaty of the 
European Union in June 2007 (later the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007), 
triggered a significant row in the British press, and was welcomed or condemned 
across Europe as an attempt to give to the Reform Treaty a less ‗Anglo-Saxon 
flavour‘14. Yet the changes mentioned above and the rise of flexicurity discourse have 
                                                          
12
 See, European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2007 on Common Principles of Flexicurity 
[2007/2209(INI)] 
13
 See ETUC‘s statement, available at: http://www.etuc.org/a/4333. 
14
 Similarly, see the controversy over the creation of the EU Reflection Group, Horizon 2020-2030.  
For the Reform Treaty, among others, see: ‗A Less ―Anglo-Saxon‖ EU: Sarkozy Scraps Competition 
Clause From New Treaty‘, Spiegel Online, June 22, 2007. For the Reflection Group see the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (14 December 2007), and Stephen Castle and Dan 
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undoubtedly changed the terms of engagement for these two opposing 
discourses/projects, and have changed the impact that their polarizing nature had on 
the EU public discourse and policy-making. The successful conclusion of the 
negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon further consolidated this new 
dynamic. 
 
Significant as they are, all of these developments point to a rather introverted EU 
public discourse focusing on domestic EU reforms. Within this conjuncture and 
taking stock of the positive climate in the EU, the European Commission tried to 
change this introversion by developing a discourse, which had as its main focus the 
EU‘s potential to ‗shape globalization‘15. The next section discusses this EU 
leadership aspiration and potential in the global political economy (focusing mainly 
on the realm of multilateral trade regime), and the dilemmas this aspiration creates for 
the EU itself. 
 
 
Global Europe and its Discontents: Possibilities and Obstacles 
 
During the WTO Doha Round negotiations, ‗a key part of Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson‘s strategy was to present the US as the problem and the EU as part of the 
solution‘ (Allen and Smith 2007, 166). In this manner, the European Commission 
tried to develop, and to appear to have developed, a leadership role in the Doha 
negotiations. At the same time, Peter Mandelson (2006), in his capacity as EU Trade 
Commissioner, proposed the adoption of a ‗decidedly hard-headed‘ EU trade strategy, 
based on two broad pillars. First, a ‗new strategic approach to market access‘, that is 
the adoption of a stronger stance and more assertive policy towards countries that 
impose ‗barriers in overseas markets—not just tariffs on goods, but . . . [also] non 
tariff barriers, especially those which operate behind-the-border on goods, and 
crucially, on services‘. Second, a review of how the EU can ‗take forwards key 
strategic relationships both multilaterally and bilaterally‘ (emphasis added) and a 
review of the way in which the EU uses its trade defense instruments
16
. This proposal 
was formalized in the European Commission‘s document Global Europe: Competing 
in the world, which was adopted by the Council of the EU in June 2007 (European 
Commission 2006)
17
. This new document seems to represent a shift in the guiding 
doctrine of EU trade policy away from the concept of ‗managed globalization‘, 
promoted by the previous EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (1999–2004), and 
towards the aforementioned concept of ‗Global Europe‘ championed by Peter 
Mandelson
18; a shift that represents the adoption of a more ‗assertive‘ and ‗offensive‘ 
trade strategy (see the discussion in Meunier 2007, especially 916–917). Specifically, 
the new document emphasizes the need for a ‗renewed and reinforced market access 
strategy‘, new measures for opening ‗procurement markets abroad‘, a review of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bilefsky, ‗Sarkozy and Brown Offer Starkly Different Futures for EU‘, International Herald Tribune, 
14/12/2007. 
15
 See for instance, Barroso (2007); see also the European Commission (2007d). 
16
 Within this framework, Mandelson (2006) singled out the need for the EU to define and develop 
‗strong trade relationships with Asia‘. See also European Commission (2006, 15). For the EU‘s 
bilateral relationships in 2006, see Allen and Smith (2007) and Zimmermann (2007). 
17
 See the draft Council conclusions, document 10542/07 WTO 127 COMER 90, 8 June 2007, at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10542.en07.pdf. 
18
 Peter Mandelson left his position in the European Commission on 3 October 2008, to join Gordon 
Brown‘s government as Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. 
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use of trade-defence instruments, a strategic partnership with China, ‗a second phase 
of the EU Intellectual Property Rights enforcement strategy‘, and ‗a new generation 
of carefully selected and prioritized‘ bilateral Free Trade Agreements (European 
Commission 2006, 28). 
 
The European Commission‘s eagerness to develop a leadership role in the Doha 
negotiations and a more assertive policy on the world economic stage is unsurprising. 
The field of international economy in general, and the field of international trade in 
particular, is indeed the most solid arena in which the EU can manifest its role as a 
decisive global actor (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006). It is the world‘s leading exporter 
and second largest importer of goods, and the world‘s leading exporter and importer 
of commercial services (see above in this paper). This has a significant impact on the 
international image and standing of the EU. This is also confirmed by the research 
project The external image of the European Union (EIEU; Lucarelli 2007a), one of 
the main findings of which is that the EU is seen as a ‗trade giant‘ and a ‗source of 
foreign direct investments‘, especially in developing economies. 
 
For Indian, Chinese, South African and Brazilian elites, the EU is a strategic opportunity 
for development and economic growth and is mainly described as . . . the biggest market in 
the world. (Lucarelli 2007b, 16–17). 
 
A former Brazilian Secretary General for External Relations stated for instance that 
‗[i]ts fifteen members, together, represent the largest market for Brazilian exports and 
the main source of FDI in Brazil‘ (quoted in Lucarelli 2007b, 17). Similarly, the 
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, stated that the EU is ‗not only India‘s 
largest trading partner, but also our largest source of FDI‘ (quoted in Lucarelli 2007b, 
17). 
 
Trade negotiations fall under the Commission‘s mandate, therefore the EU speaks 
with a single voice in international fora (Woolcock 2000; Meunier 2005; Dür 2006), 
avoiding the polyphony usually found in the field of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. The EU‘s reputation and traditional stance in favour of multilateralism and 
diplomacy, in opposition to the assertive and unilateral stance adopted by the US 
during the George W Bush administrations, has enhanced the EU‘s international 
image vis-a`-vis the US. The European Commission‘s prioritization of multilateralism 
in trade negotiations and ‗informal‘ moratorium on (new) bilateral trade agreements, 
during Pascal Lamy‘s tenure as EU Trade Commissioner (1994–2004) (Meunier 
2007), reinforced the EU‘s image as a ‗committed multilateralist‘, in stark contrast to 
the US ‗competitive liberalization‘ policy (Meunier 2007, 912–913). Along similar 
lines, Chaban, Elgström and Holland conducted interviews with participants in the 
negotiations within the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) and the UN Forum for Forest (UNFF) and found that ‗the EU is at times seen 
as a counterbalance, or a softer alternative, to the ―American superpower‖, being 
more ―accommodative‖ and less ―confrontational‖ than the USA‘ (Chaban et al 2006, 
252; see also Elgström 2007, 962). The image of the EU as a ‗champion of 
multilateralism‘ (in contrast to the US) was also one of the main findings of the EIEU 
project mentioned above (Lucarelli 2007a; 2007b), as well as of Elgström‘s (2007, 
especially 960, 962) research on the EU‘s image within the WTO. 
 
Accordingly the EU, through the European Commission, has tried to put itself 
forward as the defender of developing countries and a leader in Doha negotiations. 
 17 
The ‗Everything But Arms‘ initiative (adopted in 2001) that granted duty-free access 
to imports of all products from least developed countries without any quantitative 
restrictions, except for arms and munitions
19
, was part of this EU aspiration, and it did 
seem to have some positive impact on the EU‘s image (Chaban et al 2006, 253). The 
same could be said about the EU‘s ‗Access to Essential Medicines‘ initiative, which 
was also adopted in 2001
20
. Furthermore, the EU‘s position as the world‘s largest 
economic aid donor seems also to have a positive impact on the image of the EU 
(Chaban et al 2006, 250; Bonaglia et al 2006; Elgström 2007, 962). 
 
Yet, the EU‘s ‗leadership bid‘ has not been successful, at least until now. Although 
the EU is perceived, along with the US, to be an economic superpower and a crucial 
actor in international trade negotiations, most of the EU‘s trade initiatives and 
positions—especially its attempt to widen the trade agenda by including 
environmental, labour standards and human rights issues, as well as the ‗Singapore 
issues‘—have been treated with deep suspicion and triggered negative responses from 
developing countries. In particular, the EU‘s credibility is hampered by what is widely 
perceived among developing countries as EU inconsistency, double standards and 
protectionism (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006; Elgström 2007; Lucarelli 2007a; Young 
2007). Of decisive influence here is the EU‘s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As 
Elgström concludes, ‗it will be impossible for the EU to play a real leadership role in 
the WTO as long as it carries the luggage of agricultural protectionism‘ (2007, 959). 
This EU ‗double standard‘ attribute is also reflected in Young‘s (2007) insightful 
analysis on how domestic economic interests in Europe react to EU trade policies: 
where the EU regime is more liberal than the multilateral regime these interests 
support EU trade policies, where new policies would require further liberalization and 
adjustment of the EU status quo, they push for the adoption of protectionist positions. 
Furthermore, in large parts of the developing world, the EU is also seen as a 
‗neoliberal actor‘ whose policies are not conducive to sustainable development 
(Lucarelli 2007a), thus ‗reaping the fruits‘ from its participation in the creation of the 
globalized economic order. 
 
The shift to the ‗Global Europe‘ doctrine will arguably strengthen these negative 
aspects of the EU‘s image. At the same time, however, one could not foreclose the 
possibility that a more assertive attitude and policy of the EU in the global political 
economy will enhance its image as an economic superpower and increase its 
international leadership credentials and capacity. Such a leadership role, however, 
seems to move in a different direction than a leadership role based on the notions of 
the ‗champion of multilateralism‘, ‗policy of solidarity‘ and legitimacy (on this, see 
Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006, and the contributions in Lucarelli and Manners 2006). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to explore the terms of engagement of the European Union 
with economic globalization. It has been argued that, in the field of international 
economy, the EU was not a passive receiver of economic globalisation, but rather an 
active partner in its production. This active engagement of the EU (and/through its 
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member states) in the production of the contemporary globalized economic order had 
a significant impact on the EU itself. In particular, it produced a highly polarized 
political space that was dominated by an antagonism between the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Continental models. After 2005, however, there has been a move away from this 
field of antagonism, and realignment around the concept of flexicurity. The latter 
allowed the ‗social concerns‘ of the Continental model to be addressed in tandem with 
the ‗competition concerns‘ of the Anglo-Saxon model. The proactive stance of the 
European Commission was instrumental in this development. Yet the endurance of 
this ‗discursive realignment‘ remains to be seen. 
 
The most concrete outcome of the EU‘s engagement with the ‗US order‘ can therefore 
be said to have been an EU identity crisis. The negotiation of economic globalization 
in Europe has been nothing less than a negotiation on the identity and future of 
Europe itself. After a period of internal divisions and soul-searching, flexicurity 
seems to have offered a way out from this crisis. On this basis, the EU has been eager 
to develop a new strategy for acquiring a leadership role in the international economy. 
It seems, though, that this new attempt, if successful, may once more profoundly 
change the nature of the EU. 
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